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Purpose of the Study.--The overriding purpose of this study is
to examine the United States' policies toward Viet Nam, 1954 - 1964.
More specifically, the purposes of this study are: (1) to
examine the impact of geographical factors on the political develop¬
ment of Viet Nam, (2) to ascertain the impact of traditional institu¬
tions upon the present political development, (3) to explore the United
States' involvement in Viet Nam from 1954 - 1964, (4) to investigate
the political significance of the Geneva Conference in regard to Viet
Nam, (5) to examine United States policies toward Viet Nam under the
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations.
Scope and Limitations.--The complexity of the subject has prevented
a more comprehensive analysis. The nature of the study necessitates
the exclusion of many significant factors. The scope of this study is
to view American policies over the past decade. In a large sense, we
are too close to the events surrounding Viet Nam to give an adequate
account of its possible consequences. Finally, the lack of sufficient
field research has hampered the fruitful possibilities of this study.




China conquered Viet Nam in 111 B. C,, and dominated its political,
social, and economic life for one thousand years. France conquered
Viet Nam in 1883 and her sovereignty reigned supreme until the Second
World War, In 1940, Japan conquered the country and ruled it for five
years.
America's involvement resulted from a situation produced by the
French in their attempt to reinstate control over Viet Nam after the
Second World War. In an attempt to stop the expansion of Communism
in Southeast Asia, the United States, under the Truman Administration,
in 1950, gave military and economic assistance to France.
In 1954, the Geneva Conference was held, and Viet Nam was divided
at the 17th parallel. The United States sided with the government of
South Viet Nam and began to give it military and economic aid.
American policies from 1954 to 1961 were centered around an aid program,
but in 1962 its policies changed somewhat and since that time they
have steadily increased America's involvement in that country.
Conclusion.--Viet Nam is presently a war-torn country and it is
difficult to conclude about its future. However, there are several
possible alternatives. They are: (1) the Geneva co-sponsors could
take over the Viet Nam problem, (2) the problem could be taken to the
United Nations, (3) the United States could seek a negotiated settlement,
(4) or the United States could drive for total victory.
CHA.PTER II
BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK
Geography and Strategic Location.—French Indochina was the
geographic area in mainland Southeast Asia bounded by China to the
north, the South China Sea to the east and south, and Thailand and
Burma to the west. It consisted of the French-conquered kingdoms of
Laos and Cambodia and the former Viet Nam Empire.^ Legally, Laos and
Cambodia were protectorates. The Viet Nam Empire was divided into
three parts, corresponding to its three major territorial divisions:
North, Central, and South Viet Nam, and designated respectively as
Tongking, Annam, and Cochin-China by the French.^ Tongking and Annam,
were legally one protectorate, while Cochin-China was a French Colony.
The name Vietnamese is applicable to the principal linguistic
and ethnic population stock of the former Viet Nam Empire. The Chinese
also referred to this state as Annam (Pacified South), whence the
alternate name "Annamese" to designate the people. The French adopted
this term and then narrowed its use for the inhabitants of Central
Viet Nam (Annam), as distinct from the "Tongkinese" in the north and





"Cochin-Chinese" in the south, to foster separatism. Since 1945, the
older usage has been restored and is officially used in both North
and South Viet Nam today,^
The country is estimated to be about 1,200 miles long. It
extends "from the 9th parallel North to the 26th, covering 127,000
square miles. , ,
Of the political units on the Indo-Chinese peninsula, Viet Nam
has the largest population. Its population is, according to a 1962
census, approximately 30.5 million.^
Viet Nam has a tropical wet and dry climate. There is climatic
diversity from place to place within the country. Therefore, the
temperatures might vary with altitude and latitude, with the average
annual temperatures being lower and the range greater in the highlands
of the central part of the country than in the lowlands of southern
part of the country. The country experiences dry winters and wet
moist summers, which are called the "monsoon seasons."^
What is strategic about the location of Viet Nam? In light of
the present conditions of the world, that is, in regard to the position
of Communist China, one need not be a skilled strategist to understand
why Viet Nam has a strategic location. China has a serious food short¬
age. Western agricultural experts estimate that even with twenty-five
Lennox A. Mills et al. The New World of Southeast Asia
(Minneapolis, 1949), p. 217.
^Buttinger, op. cit.. p. 17,
^Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York, 1962), p. 4.
^The monsoon of summer is the wet season
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years to recover from its present condition of starvation, China
still will not produce enough food to feed its swelling population.^
At the very south of China lies the rich riceland in Viet Nam.
This country can produce more food than its population is able to
consume. Moreover, equally important to China is the region's
location. The Southeast Asian mainland is slightly larger than western
Europe, Then, too, it dominates a vast area from the South China
Sea to the Bay of Bengal. By possessing it the Chinese could extend
their influence from India to the Philippines.
The strategic importance of Viet Nam was suddenly revealed
to the United States when the peninsula was used by the Japanese as
a springboard for their lightning offensive in the Southwest Pacific
during World War II. Besides its strategic location, it furnished
the Japanesw war machine with a large supply of vital raw materials.^
Today its strategic location is very important to the United States.
From this position in Asia the United States might be able to contain
the expansion of Communist China, or prevent China from taking over
the whole of Asia.
Historical Factors.—Viet Nam history consists mostly of
foreign domination. As far back as 111 B. C., the State of Viet Nam
was overrun by the Chinese, "and save for a few brief but glorious
Q
rebellions, it remained a Chinese colony for more than 1,000 years."
^Claude A. Buss, The Far East (New York^ 1955), p. 33.
^Willard H. Elsbree, Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist
Movements. 1940 to 1945 (Cambridge, 1953), p. 22.
^Fall, op. cit.. p. 10.
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The Vietnamese were able to successfully defeat the Chinese in 938 A, D
Bernard B. Fall writes:
By 940, the Vietnamese were in full control of
their country from the foothills of Yunnan to
the 17th parallel. Although they retained
formal suzerainty ties with China throughout most
of their history until French domination became
complete in 1883, their northern neighbor, despite
sporadic threats, never quite succeeded in
controlling the country again, save for the brief
period from 1407 to 1427.11
The Vietnamese culture was profoundly influenced by the Indian
culture previous to the invasion of Viet Nam by the Chinese, and much
of it is discernible today. John Scott notes:
During the second millenium B. C., some Dravidian
immigration took place, perhaps under the pressure
of the Aryan invasions of India. The immigrants
brought with them Sanskrit epics and exercised
religious and philosophical influence still visible
today.
So it was that the Austro-Asians living in South¬
east Asia got their first cultural infusions from
India -- probably in the second or third millenium
B. C., after Indian traders and settlers sailed
across the Bay of Bengal to the Golden Peninsula.1^
Institutional Development.—Vietnamese history has been dominated
by foreigners, and, accordingly, so have their institutions.
In 1954, at which time South Viet Nam was created, a small elite
1 ^
class, largely educated by the French, assumed political power.
^^Ibid., p. 12.
^^Ibid.
^^John Scott, Asian Journey (New York, 1957), p. 7.
l^George A. Carver, Jr., "The Real Revolution in South Viet Nam,"
Foreign Affairs, XLIII (April, 1965), 402.
10
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This class established a political order somewhat alien to the indigenous
population. As a result, this innovation produced a discontinuity in
the development of the Vietnamese political institutions; therefore,
the country is without a unifying political tradition.There are no
acceptable symbols capable of channeling disagreement in a constructive
way.^^ For that reason, the elite has not been able to successfully
institute a stable political order. The elite class is a small minority
in terms of numbers; it has prevented the peasantry from feeling a
sense of direct identification with the system.
One institution which has had a profound effect on the social,
economic and political life of Viet Nam, is that of religion. Today
in Viet Nam, religion and politics are so closely related that one
could very easily mistake one for the other. The most effective
opposition in that country has come from certain religious groups. The
Buddhists, for instance, have constantly opposed the ruling regime in
Viet Nam.
Viet Nam has three major religions; Buddhism, Confucianism, and
Christianity. Of these three. Buddhism and Christianity are presently
playing the greatest role in Vietnamese politics. Each of the religions
possesses a binding force, as well as a long tradition.
Buddhism was imported from China during the early part of Chinese





back during the Ly dynasty, at which time Viet Nam experienced its
first independent and stable government. The Ly were ardent Buddhists.
"Under their reign, official sponsorship of Buddhism and cooperation
between Viet Nam's rulers and Buddhist clergy reached its highest, and
never again equalled.So today the Buddhists identify themselves
with this dynasty, and this identification is having an intense effect
upon Vietnamese politics.
Catholicism is another imported religion which has made its im¬
print on the politics of Viet Nam. It was introduced into Viet Nam
during the seventeenth century.^® The Jesuits were the first Europeans
to establish themselves in Viet Nam permanently. After being expelled
from Japan in 1614, they established a mission in Viet Nam the following
year. Alexandre de Rhodes, a Jesuit Father, influenced Vietnamese
history. In 1645, he went to Rome to seek help for Catholic mission
endeavors in Indo-China, and suggested for the work to be administered
by the native priests who were ordained and guided by the European
bishops directly responsible to the Pope. While the Pope was thinking
over this proposition. Father Alexandre, a Frenchman by birth, went
to Paris to enlist workers and raise money to carry out his plans.
He did not have any trouble in getting assistance for his idea.
The French nobles and merchants wanted to undermine the Portuguese-
Spanish monopoly of trade in Southeast Asia. With the above mentioned




founded "what became the powerful and politically influential Society
of Foreign Missions.In essence. Father Alexandre established the
French interest and association with Viet Nam.
The rebellion and civil war, known as the Tay Son revolt, took
place during the latter quarter of the eighteenth century. This
revolt began in the mountainous region of Central Viet Nam, and then
it spread to the coastal plains. In 1775 the Tay Son, under the
leadership of three brothers, invaded the southern principality and
overran the defenses at Dong Hoi. The consequences of the revolt
paved the way for foreign intervention.
The ruler of the southern throne, Nguyen Anh, was taken in and
protected by Mgr. Pigneau de Behaine, Apostolic Vicar of the southern
part of Viet Nam, then known as Cochin-China. The Bishop decided to
advise the dethroned ruler. In spite of the consequences that such
advice might entail for the Christian communities, he urged Nguyen Anh
to enlist France's aid against the Tay Son.
In 1787, Mgr. Pigneau went to France to seek official assistance
for the Nguyen cause. During the reign of Louis XVI, an aid program
was drawn up and signed, but, in order for Nguyen Anh to acquire this
aid, he had to promise certain territorial and trade concessions. With
the French -paid soldiers and other aid, the war ended in Nguyen's
favor. Before the war was over, all of the Vietnamese Catholic rallied




"At Hue, in 1802, he proclaimed himself the Emperor Gia Long-founding
a dynasty which reigned until its last member, Bao Dai, was deposed in
1955."2°
Nguyen Anh was thankful for the aid the French had given him,
and at the time of his death requested "that there was to be no per¬
secution of these three religions then established in his empire,
that is, Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity," His successors
disregarded the request, and "from time to time they permitted or
initiated repressive actions against French missionary priests and
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pogroms against Vietnamese Catholics." For their actions, France
was forced to protect its missionaries. And, too, France, at that
particular time, was seeking an excuse to take territory; therefore,
the suppression of Vietnamese Catholics and foreign missionaries was
excuse enough. "The murder of a Spanish bishop in 1857 prompted
Franco-Spanish reaction which suffered numerous reverses but finally
(in 1862)forced Tu Due to cede Cochin-China's three eastern provinces
to France.What was the result of this story? George A. Carver
explains;
This whole complex and bloody story developed ani¬
mosities which still plague Vietnamese political
life. Among Vietnamese Catholics it engendered a
sense of clannishness, alienation from their non¬






of persecution. Among the non-catholic Vietnamese,
however, it engendered a sentiment epitomized by
the saying attributed to one of Tu Due's most power¬
ful Manderins, that Vietnamese Catholic served as the
claws which enabled the French Crab to crawl across
the land.^^
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, France estab¬
lished its control over the political life of Viet Nam, which continued
until the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia during the Second World
War.
Today Viet Nam's institutions are plagued by their history and
development. Because of a discontinuity in its politics, Viet Nam
has an unstable government. The institution of religion has taken on
the role of political parties because of this vacuum created as a
result of political instability.
French and Japanese Occupations.--French colonial rule revolution¬
ized the Vietnamese society. Its great power did not derive from any
popular consent. It was neither for the people, nor by the people, nor
of the people.
Whatever the system, it remained an incontrovertible fact that
governmental and economic policy was made and changed by foreigners to
whose thoughts and meetings the Vietnamese had no access. And the
ultimate directors did not even reside in the country they ruled; their
majority did not even know them.^^ They sat in distant capitals and
^^Ibid.
^^Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indochina (London,
1961), pp. 77-8.
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based many of their decisions on political conditions, which had
little or nothing to do with the conditions of the community concerned.
Colonial rule, even in its most successful form, suffered from the
evils of absentee landlordism.
When we try to imagine the impression this all-embracing domination
made on the Vietnamese mind, we begin to understand the origins and
force of Vietnamese nationalism. The mass of the people, for many
years, were but dimly aware of the situation, but every Vietnamese who
stood or rose above this mass found himself in a corridor of which the
exit was blocked by a French boss and realized that in the last resort
he would always have to obey an alien command,
France's domination of Viet Nam ended briefly during World War
II. After Germany overran France in the spring of 1940, the French
position in Viet Nam was made precarious because American and English
policies were geared to the war-efforts in Europe, According to Cole,
the "Japanese and German pressures on the governments in Vichy and
27
Hanoi became irresistible," In 1940, Japan invaded Tongking to cut¬
off the Chinese resistance. The following year Cochin-China fell to
the Japanese, From this position, the Japanese established bases to
aid in her further expansion into Southeast Asia. For the first four
years of Japanese occupation, they permitted the French in Vichy to
maintain their administrative sovereignty. However, on March 9, 1945,
^^Ibid.
27Allan B. Cole, (ed.). Conflict in Indo-China & International
Repercussions (New York, 1956), p. xxiii.
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"the Japanese suddenly interned French troops and administrative person¬
nel.
The period of Japanese domination of Viet Nam, gave impetus to
the Vietnamese "National Liberation Front." Allan B. Cole pointed out
that the Japanese advocated "doctrines of 'Asia for the Asiatics' and
of 'oriental moralism'."29 They also influenced the nationalist
movement by granting the Vietnamese their independence. When the
Japanese realized that the Allied Powers' invasion of Southeast Asia
was imminent, they promptly moved and permitted Viet Nam to declare
its independence. Joseph Buttinger says;
The forceful removal of French cleared the way for
a Vietnamese national government, which was set up
at Hue and was permitted by the Japanese to proclaim
the independence of Viet Nam. This government lacked
both the means and the freedom of action to establish
its authority over the whole country. However, the
circumstances of its formation convinced the Vietnamese
people that the end of the Second World War would
also bring them the end of foreign rule.30
Prior to the internment of the French by the Japanese in Viet
Nam, "French forces suppressed nationalist rebellions and demonstrations,
thus jeopardizing prospects of possible French alliance with Indochinese
nationalists against the Japanese and possibly into a dimly calculated
post-war period.Japanese troops in many instances protected the
pro-Japanese Vietnamese nationalists from the French. Many of the
^^Ibid.. p. xxii.
29ibid.
^Oguttinger, op. cit., pp. 438-39
31cole, op. cit., p. xxii.
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nationalist groups were anti-Japanese, An example of this was the
group under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. He was one of the first
who "began to organize guerilla groups for anti-Japanese activities
in northern Tongking."^^ Bernard B. Fall tells us that
, . .it was the Viet Minh that created the first
anti-Japanese guerrilla forces in Viet Nam, that
rescued American fliers shot down in Indochina,
that provided intelligence to the Allies, that
spread its propaganda among the civilian population,
and that received all the credit for anti-Japanese
activities during the war.33
Japanese occupation of Viet Nam ended with the invasion of
Southeast Asia by the Allied Powers. After the defeat of Japan, the
French attempted to establish their sovereignty over Viet Nam a
second time. The consequences of this long struggle on the part of
France eventually involved the United States.
32Buttinger, op. cit.. p, 440.
33Fall, op. cit., p, 63
CHAPTER III
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND THE DIVISION OF VIET NAM
Forces and Conditions.—There were certain forces and conditions
which produced the Geneva Conference and its consequences for Viet Nam.
Those forces were: (1) nationalism, (2) anti-colonialism, (3) and a
desire for a better life on the part of the Vietnamese. Those
conditions were: (1) a war-torn country, (2) and widespread poverty,
illiteracy and disease.
A tremendous urge to shape their own destiny and a desire to
share more of the fruits of their land and labor have combined into
the dynamic surge of Vietnamese nationalism,. Meeting social, economic
and political barriers, Vietnamese nationalism piles up in protest,
sometimes passive and sometimes bloody:
. . .the high point of opposition to French rule
came in February 1930 when two companies of
Tongkinese troops mutinied at Yen-bay, killing
six of their officers. Outbreaks followed
throughout the colony during the rest of the
year. The French suppressed these movements
vigorously and with considerable effective-
ness--so much so that there was marked criticism
of the colonial administration in France itself.^
^Lawrance K. Rosinger, "France and the Future of Indo-China,"
Foreign Policy Reports, May 15, 1945, p. 57.
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In its early phase of development, the nationalist movement was con¬
centrated in Central Viet Nam or (Annam),^ However, there have been
many bloody revolts since 1930, mainly in North Annam and Tongking.
On what foundation is the Vietnamese nationalism based? The
bases of the Vietnamese nationalism go back to the influence that
China left after her 1,000 years of rule,^ The Chinese implanted
the Confucian state system in Viet Nam along with its concepts of
values. The state, like the Chinese, was highly centralized and
patriarchal. The Emperor was sovereign but his powers were not
hereditary. He was to see to it that his subjects were well-protected.
If he were to fail in this duty, the subjects had a right to rebel
and place someone else on the throne.^
The Emperor had a bureaucracy composed of mandarin administra¬
tors to assist him, Viet Nam had no feudal system but a highly
centralized administration.^ The Vietnamese commune system, an
institution peculiar to the Far East, was the unit which had the most
influence in the life of the individual. Their organization was
similar to that of the family. The commune owns roads, houses, woods
and pastorage. An interesting thing found in the commune was collective
property.
^Ibid.
^Frank N. Thayer, (ed.), "Marxism in Viet Nam," Marxism in




The roots of discontent lie in the fact that France disregarded
the Vietnamese institutions in her attempt to colonize that country.
The French were in control of every phase of the Vietnamese life.
They destroyed not only the top authority, but also tried to destroy
the bottom, that is, the commune. By destroying it, the French
were destroying the very base of Viet Nam life.
Another factor in Vietnamese discontent with French rule was
the position of the native in the government. The civil service and
magistracy were open only to those natives who had become French
citizens. Higher administrative positions were totally closed to
them.
Those are but a few of the pressing issues that gave impetus to
Vietnamese nationalism. It was those type of issues which the
nationalist
. . .campaign has been carried on relentlessly,
ruthlessly and with great tactical flexibility.
It has been waged through a protean variety of
organizational forms and has made extensive,
effective use of successive 'front' devices —
the Viet Minh League, the Lien Viet, the Father-
land Front and, currently, the 'National Front
for the Liberation of South Viet Nam' — each
of which has been successful in deceiving Vietnamese
and, especially, foreign observers.^
Communist influence has infiltrated the leadership of the Viet
Minh and gained considerable control over the nationalist movement. As
it developed, nationalism was essentially expressed in northern Viet
Nam. It was stimulated by the victory of Japan over Russia in 1904-5,
^George A, Carver, Jr,, "The Real Revolution in South Viet Nam,"
Foreign Affairs, XLII (April, 1965), 404.
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and also by the use of Vietnamese laborers and soldiers in the First
World War. The leadership of the movement came from among the French
educated intellectuals who had observed the French liberal tradition.
Though France naturally never wanted an indigenous
nationalist movement to destroy her sovereignty,
French institutions were so impregnated with the
liberal ideas of 1789 that they unconsciously
fostered patriotism and a love of political
liberty in subject people.^
Perhaps the Nationalist movement started in Northern Viet Nam
because that section of the country was a protectorate; whereas, the
southern section of the country was a colony, and France had more
direct control over its political life.®
With the growth of nationalism, many parties were developed.
Each had its own aims, goals and objectives. Vinacke maintains that
despite the failure of the parties to attain
significant mass support, and in spite of the
differences which appeared among their leaders
resulting in division into separate parties, the
fact remained that the French had been confronted
by a nationalist development in Indochina before
the outbreak of World War II.^
What was the unifying element that brought these parties together?
Vinacke continues:
The anti-Japanese resistance movement drew together
the divergent nationalist elements, who assisted
in forming an underground by those opposed to Japanese
control of a French colony but not to the restoration
of French rule. . . . Consequently the Vietnamese
^Rupert Emerson, Lennox A. Mills, and Virginia Thompson, Govern¬
ment and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (New York, 1942), p. 198.
®Harold M. Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics in the Post-war Period
(New York, 1956), p. 269.
^Ibid.. p. 270.
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resistance movement, as far as one developed, much
before the end of the war, presented a mixture of
motives and attitudes with respect to France but
had a unified purpose with respect to Japan.
On March 9, 1945, after the Japanese realized that her surrender
was near, they decided to free the Vietnamese from French rule, Bao Dai
was established as Emperor of Annam. His regime was short-lived, for
the underground nationalists waged war against him and in August, 1945,
they displaced him. During "that time they were organized as the
Viet Nam Independence League (the Viet Minh)," this party was under
the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, an outstanding nationalist and a known
Communist.It was the efforts of this party which caused Bao Dai
to move down and allow the Miet Minh to establish the "Republic of
Viet Nam." In September, 1945, the party proclaimed the independence
of the Republic of Viet Nam. Its concept of the Republic of Viet Nam
included "the French colony of Cochin-China and the protectorates of
12
Annam and Tongking."
. . .the Viet Minh were willing to go further than
any other nationalist group in making concessions
to the French. Under an agreement signed in
March, 1946, the French government recognized the
Republic of Viet Nam 'as a free state, having its
own government, parliament, army and treasury,





^^Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., The United States and Sino-Soviet Bloc
in Southeast Asia (Washington, 1962), p, 49.
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The Viet Minh believed that the result of this move should have
settled the issue of colonialism once and for all.^^ France, on the
other hand, did not concur with the concept of ridding Viet Nam of
colonialism. As mentioned, France wanted to establish a federal
union in which Indo-China as a whole was to be included. In 1943,
General de Gaulle held that Indo-China "would have 'a new political
status within the French community',"As it were demonstrated, the
nationalists did not agree with the French concept. They believed
that it was another form of colonial domination. While the two
parties could not agree on the fundamental issue, France moved to
establish a firm control over the situation,
France used the Allied Powers in her endeavors to re-occupy
Indo-China. Much of her effort was impeded by the fact that Japan had
allowed the Vietnamese to declare their independence. The time ele¬
ment between the Japanese capitulation "and the arrival of Allied
16
forces" also contributed to this impediment. The British and
Chinese were the forces that entered Indo-China to receive the sur¬
render of the Japanese, They occupied different sections of the
country. The British were south of the 16th parallel and the Chinese
were to the north of it.
The British, upon their arrival in the South of Viet Nam, took
over the Saigon Government and released all French troops from




internment. In the North of Viet Nam, on the other hand, the Chinese
carried out their operations within the framework of the existing
regime.Therefore, when "the Chinese troops were withdrawn from
their zone of military occupation," they left France with the problem
of adjusting its "relations with the Viet Nam Republic, which was
still in control."
. , .the United States offered no protest when France
prepared, in August and September of 1945, to re¬
occupy Indochina. Indeed, the French forces sent to
Indochina were armed largely with American lend-lease
weapons. From August, 1945 until December, 1946,
when the French effort to restore full colonial rule
over Vietnam resulted in general hostilities, the
United States government made no serious attempt even
to persuade France to live up to its 1946 agreements
with the Republic of Vietnam.
. , .the attempt to regain complete control over Indo¬
china caused France grave economic, political, and
spiritual damage, the effects of which are still being
felt. Finally, the French effort to overcome the
Republic of Vietnam drove its leaders, who had
demonstrated a desire to retain close ties with France,
into the arms of Communist China.^8
The struggle between France and the Republic of Viet Nam lasted
for eight years,(from December 19, 1946 to July 20, 1954) before some
t3^e of an agreement was made. In 1954, an international conference
at Geneva divided Viet Nam into two parts at the 17th parallel. To
the north was the "Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, tmder the leader¬
ship of Ho Chi Minh; and to the south was the Republic of Viet Nam,
under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem. The conference provided for
^^Ibid.. p. 273.
18Clubb, op. cit.. p, 51.
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elections to be held in 1956;"^^ these elections were to have reunited
Viet Nam.
The parties .which attended the Geneva Conference were "the five
strongest powers emerging from the Second World War," that is, "the
United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and the
People's Republic of China."20
The elections were never held, according to Deane, because the
United States together with South Viet Nam refused to hold the elec-
tions. Presently, North and South Viet Nam are at war against each
other.
South Viet Nam.--South Viet Nam is a political unit created out
of the Viet Nam empire as a result of the Geneva Conference of 1954.
On the eve of the Conference which created it, a new political leader
was projected to the top position in that country. He was appointed
by Bao Dai in June of 1954. This personality was Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem
was a Catholic, a nationalist, and a non-Communist. He was favorable
in the eyes of the Western world in that he would appear to all of the
no
non-Communists, thus, saving the country from Communist control.
The elections which were scheduled to take place two years after
the accords were never held because Diem claimed the people of North
Viet Nam were not free.23 It seems that Diem's real purpose for not
39vinacke, op. cit., p. 286.
^^Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia; 1945-1958
(New York, 1958), p. 275.




permitting the elections was the population of North Viet Nam. The
North Vietnamese leaders were certain of a victory for the same
reason that Diem had refused to hold the elections. With the suspension
of the elections by Diem, an uprising was begun in South Viet Nam.
The United States has been an ardent supporter of the South
Vietnamese government and "made a determined effort to sustain the
Ngo Dinh Diem regime against the Viet Minh challenge.Although
the United States did not sign the accord, it was agreed that it would
"refrain from use of force to upset the agreement." The United
States made it clear, nevertheless, that it "would view any renewal of
aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern
and as seriously threatening international peace and security.
Insurrection soon developed in the South. In other
words, the Communists started violating the Geneva
Agreement almost immediately. By 1955, Communist
activity was brought out into the open. After mid-
1957, subversion and armed activity by Communists
in the South increased rapidly. By early 1961,
both the Diem Government and the Americans recog¬
nized they were up against full-fledged insurgency.^6
The United States, as an external force, has affected the situation in
Viet Nam, It has been a major factor in determining the political
fortune of the governing regime in South Viet Nam. With the United
States' assistance. South Viet Nam is still fighting. South Viet Nam
was not a party to the Geneva accords; however, the United States was
^^Clubb, op. cit., p. 72.
^^ABC's of The War in Viet Nam,"
June 28, 1965, p. 36,
26,1,. jIbid.
U. S. News and World Report,
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but she refused to sign the accord.
North Viet Nam.--North Viet Nam is the northern section of Viet Nam
which was also created as a state in 1954. After the defeat of the French
at Dienbienphu in 1954, Viet Nam's dividing line was the 17th parallel.
Both halves claimed full independence, and the French pulled out entirely.
Communist rule under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh was established
in the North. Whereas the South of Viet Nam only had a population of 14
million. North Viet Nam had one of 18 million.In regard to the elec¬
tions that the Geneva Agreement provided for. North Viet Nam was, perhaps,
in favor of them. The leaders believed that they would have won the e-
lections since their section of the country held a majority of the popu¬
lation. The dream was never realized because South Viet Nam's governing
regime never agreed to hold the elections agains a four million odd,
which was not in its favor.
The nationalist movement had its strongest supporters in North Viet
Nam. The strongest elements of anti-colonialism, anti-Japanese and
pro-Communist were always located in that region which comprises North
Viet Nam. It was primarily the North Vietnamese who fought the Japanese
during the Second World War. They fought the French for eight years,
and caused them to take the struggle to the conference in Geneva, in
1954. Presently, they are fighting the United States, and we are too
close to the events surrounding Viet Nam to make predictions concerning
the consequences of this war. Nevertheless, the North Viet Nam regime
has won support from the Soviet Union and Communist China.
27Ibid.
28vinacke, op. cit.. p. 294.
CHAPTER IV
UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIET NAM
Economic and Military Assistance.—How did the United States
become entangled in Viet Nam? Why is the United States in Viet Nam?
The United States has a great stake: security, political, economic,
ideological, and humanitarian concerns. The United States considers
Viet Nam an essential area for the preservation of peace and
security in Southeast Asia.
The United States has been directly or indirectly engaged in
Viet Nam for the past twenty-five years. Bernard B. Fall argues:
The United States, in one way or another and often
by what she failed to do as well as by what she
did, has been heavily involved in Vietnam's fate
since 1940.^
Between 1940 and 1950, the role pursued in Viet Nam by the United
States was minor compared to its role today.
From 1940 to 1945, Viet Nam was occupied by the Japanese. The
French civil administration was permitted to continue its functions
under Japanese control. A strong opposition developed, largely
Communist-directed, against both the Japanese and the French. Ho
Chi Minh and his Viet Minh group were leading the opposition.
^Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams (New York, 1962), p. 322.
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During the Second World War, the United States gave the Viet
Minh aid in return for information concerning Japanese activities.
The information was given to the United States Office of Strategic
Services, and this agency in turn supplied the Viet Minh with weapons.^
Within days after the Japanese surrendered in August of 1945, opposi¬
tion elements organized a revolutionary regime which proclaimed a
Republic of Viet Nam,
The Post-war period presented France the opportunity to re¬
conquer Viet Nam, though the French were never able to regain full
control there. The United States was not interested in seeing the
French put the Vietnamese back under colonial rule. Our position on
this matter was explained by President Roosevelt at the Yalta Con¬
ference. According to the New York Times, the
President then said he also had in mind a trustee¬
ship for Indo-China. He added that the British
did not approve of this idea as they wished to give
it back to the French since they feared the implica¬
tions of a trusteeship as it might affect Burma.3
After the President's statement, Russian Prime Minister
Marshal Stalin remarked that the British had lost
Burma once through reliance on Indochina, and it
was not his opinion that Britain was a sure
country to protect this area. He added that he
thought Indochina was a very important area.^
^George A. Carver, Jr., "The Real Revolution In Viet-Nam,"
Foreign Affairs, XLIII (April, 1965), 405.
^"Minutes of Far East Discussions by President Roosevelt and
Premier Stalin," New York Times, March 17, 1955, p, 65.
^bid.
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Are the people of Indo-China war-llke, or are they peace„loving?
The President said that the Indochinese were people
of small stature, like the Javanese and Burmese,
and were not war like. He added that France had done
nothing to improve the natives since she had the
colony. He said that General de Gaulle had asked
for ships to transport French forces to Indochina.5
Acting somewhat puzzled over that statement,
Marshall Stalin inquired where de Gaulle was going.^
In order to clarify himself,
the President replied that de Gaulle said he was going
to find the troops when the President could find
the ships, but the President added that up to the
present he had been unable to find the ships. , , J
The President held strong views regarding the future of Indo-
China. He felt that America's victory in the Pacific should not be
followed by the return of Indo-China to France.
The French effort to restore full colonial rule over Viet Nam
resulted in general hostilities and created a condition which gave the
Communist Party of Indo-China the opportunity to launch a successful
general uprising. The Communists saw an opportunity to exploit the
chaotic situation by putting their members in key positions.
What started as a national liberation movement ended up as a
Communist take-over. The United States remained aloof until 1949,





concerning Chinese Communist intentions in Southeast Asia. After our
government learned of the Communist intrigue, it embarked upon a
policy known as containment. In a widely circulated article on "The
Sources of Soviet Conduct," Kennan enunciated the containment theory
as America's response to the challenge of Communism,®
The immediate post-war period had witnessed Communist intrigue
in such countries as Iran, Turkey, Greece, Indo-China, and China.
With the threat of a Communist take-over in Viet Nam, the United States
commenced to contain the Communists by giving economic and military
aid to France,
In 1950, the United States sent some experts to Viet Nam as
overseers of the economic and military aid given to France to help in
its war against the Communists. After the defeat of the French at
Dienbienphu in 1954, and their leaving Viet Nam in 1956, President
Eisenhower ordered United States' advisers to go to Viet Nam and train
the South Vietnamese troops. This program consisted of fewer than
800 Americans. Subversion and infiltration were the Communist's largest
operation until 1960.
Since 1960, the Communist Viet Cong has taken the offensive.
It started making heavy inroads by turning to full-scale guerrilla war¬
fare throughout South Viet Nam. In order for the United States to
counteract the Viet Cong operations. President Kennedy promised South
Viet Nam that we would play a more active role there. The United
8
George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign
Affairs, XXV (July, 1947), 556-83.
29
States would do its best to protect South Viet Nam from Communism, We
increased our assistance to this area so that our promise could be
carried out.
At first, the U. S. moved very slowly, increased
advisory strength to 2,000, delivered propeller-
driven bombers to Vietnamese, ordered U. S.
servicemen to accompany Vietnamese Government
troops into the field.^
Since 1960, economic and military aid has been on the increase:
1962 U. S. expanded its military headquarters in
Saigon, put a four star general in charge, in¬
creased advisory force to 11,000 men, started
flying Vietnamese to battle in helicopters.10
Although the United States was spending something in the neigh¬
borhood of 500 million dollars a year in its effort to combat communism,
the Communists have been able to overrun sizable areas in South Viet
Nam, In an attempt to stop this type of offensive action, the United
States has sent in "anti-guerrilla fighters."!^
It seems that the United States is always required to give addi¬
tional aid. There was an augmentation of aid to Viet Nam in 1963.
President Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown and assassi¬
nated, touching off continuing instability. U. S,
moved in more vigorously. South Vietnamese Army
was strengthened by 100,000 men. Niomber of U. S.
Advisers was increased to 15,500. U. S. took a more
direct part in air and ground operations against the
Communists,12
^"ABC's of
June 28, 1965, p.






Despite increasing United States assistance, the situation there
seems to grow worse instead of better. It was in 1963 that the Viet
Cong, for the first time, began to attack Americans. United States
aid to Viet Nam continued to increase in 1964;
U. S. increased strength to 23,000 men after Communists
started direct attacks on U. S. installations in the
South, President Johnson became third President to
make pledge to help defend South Vietnam from Red
take-over, sent in modern jet fighter bombers,
doubled sized of Special Forces, , , first bombing
of North Vietnam,
The United States finds itself engaged in a war 8,000 miles from
home. We have "committed an important part of the Seventh Fleet, with
its aircraft carriers and 64,000 men,"^^ Along with that, 17,000
marines, 27,500 army troops, and the Air Force with 300 bombers and
9,000 airmen,Where this will eventually lead the United States is
anybody's guess.
Political and Ideological Concern,--American policy toward Viet
Nam after the Geneva settlement centered around an aid program. It was
in effect associated with the Diem regime. Senator Mansfield maintained
in 1955:
The consistent support of the United States has
done much to uphold Diem, , , , It has also
contributed to raising the international stature
of his government. Through the aid program, more¬
over, our policy is helping to resettle the re¬
fugees from the north, to revitalize the national
13lbid,
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srmyj to sustain the Vietnamese economy and to
improve the civilian administration.16
Even with United States aid. Diem disappointed "his supporters
by his failure to provide the firm leadership which"^^ the political
situation required. He refused to delegate any of the power which
had been placed upon him. According to Lancaster;
Diem could count neither on the support of the
police and security services nor on the loyalty
of the armed forces, while he had alienated the
sympathy of the French authorities by a censorious
refusal to forget old grievances, ... Diem was
to prove that he held nevertheless a trump card.
This was the assurance of unqualified and unfaltering
American support, which assumed the form of a
threat to withhold the economic aid and financial
support on which the survival of the state depended.^®
It seems that under that condition. Diem was a puppet of the
United States,
Diem's actions caused him to restrict his opposition's freedom
of expression. Those moves could have very easily made the opposition
become associated with or sympathetic to the Communists.
American officials became emotionally involved in
a struggle the outcome of which was to saddle the
American Government with some moral responsibility
for investing the Prime Minister, his family, and
his clients with control of the state's administra¬
tive machinery, , , ,this investiture was secured
not only in face of resistance by the sects and
amned groups, whose assimilation would have repre¬
sented the first task of any responsible government,
but also in spite of opposition from the army and





from the vast majority of those Vietnamese whose
services seem to have entitled them to play some
part in the creation of an independent state.
That statement verifies the fact that the United States has had
a profound impact upon Vietnamese politics. In 1963, elements of the
opposition overthrew the Diem Government and since then Viet Nam has
had many unpopular leaders to try and run the government.
Social and Humanitarian Concern.—Just as the French left an
imprint on the institutions of Viet Nam, the United States will do no
less for South Viet Nam. Since 1954, the United States has pursued
a humanitarian policy as well as the economic and military policies.
This country has spent well over two million dollars for humanitarian
endeavors alone since it became involved in South Viet Nam.^O
Despite the war effort, the United States has made considerable
gains in this area with most of our efforts "concentrated on food and
21health and education and housing and industry."
South Viet Nam shares many of the problems of other undeveloped
countries. Its economy, for example, is based on agriculture. The
United States has facilitated Viet Nam's agricultural development.
President Johnson notes;
, . .we have put our American farm knowhow to work
on other crops. This year, for instance, several
hundred million cuttings of a new variety of sweet
^^Ibid.. p, 347,
^^"Transcript of Address by President on Viet Nam War and China's
Role," New York Times, May 4, 1965, p, 12.
^^Ibid,
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potato that promises a sixfold increase yield will
be distributed to these Vietnamese farmers.
Com output should rise from 25,000 tons in 1962 to
100,000 tons by 1966. Pig production has more than
doubled since 1955. Many animal diseases have been
eliminated entirely.22
In addition to this agricultural assistance, the United States
is making great headway in improving the conditions which will give
the Vietnamese a longer life expectancy. It has been pointed out that
Vietnamese people have "a life expectancy of only 35 years, there are
only 200 civilian doctors"^^ to treat a population of 16 million
people.
There is no way for all of the ill persons to receive medical
attention. The United States has taken up the task of supplying the
Vietnamese population with an appropriate number of doctors. President
Johnson said;
. . .we have helped vaccinate already over seven
million people against cholera and millions more
against other diseases. Hundreds of thousands of
Vietnamese can now receive treatment in the more
than 12,000 hamlet health stations that America
has built and has stocked.
New clinics and surgical suites are scattered
throughout that entire country. And the medical
school that we are now helping to build will
graduate as many doctors in a single year as
now serve the entire population of South Viet Nam. ^
From all indications, we can look forward to seeing the day when





various diseases found in its population. When, and if this goal is
accomplished, most credit should go to the United States for its
humanitarianism.
If any society is to progress as well as perpetuate its tradi¬
tions, it must consider some viable way of training its young. In
the area of education, the Vietnamese society is no exception. It
does matter whether it is a highly industrialized society, or an
agrarian one, there must be some way of passing down to the younger
generation, its cultural life.
In this field the United States is making a great contribution.
Education is the keystone of future development in
Vietnam. It takes a trained people to man the
factories, to conduct the administration, to form
the human foundation for an advancing nation.^5
If education is the keystone to future development in Viet Nam,
what has the United States done to enhance that development?
For more than a quarter of a million young Viet¬
namese can now learn in more than 4,000 classrooms
that America has helped to build in the last two
years. And 2,000 more schools are being built by
us.
The number of students in vocational schools has
gone up four times. Enrollment was 300,000 in 1955,
when we first entered there and started helping with
our program. It is today more than 1,500,000.
And the 8 million textbooks that we have supplied







With agriculture as the basis of society, and health and education
as essential himan needs, what role does industry play in the Vietnamese
society? First, Viet Nam has large quantities of natural resources,
and it only needs someone with industrial knowhow to help develop
them. America has tried to supply the Vietnamese with this know-how.
For if her natural resources are ever developed, Viet Nam could very
well become a highly industrialized society.
Industrial development is the great pathway to
their future.
When Vietnam was divided, most of the industry
was in the North, The South was barren of manu¬
facturing and the foundation for industry.
But today more than 700 new or rehabilitated
factories — textile mills and cement plants,
electronic and plastics — are changing the
entire face of that nation. New roads and
communications, railroad equipment, electric
generators are a spreading base on which this
new industry can and is growing.27
The United States' humanitarian concern has grown out of a deep
need on the part of the Vietnamese people. America's effort in that
country is to cure the conditions which make for communism. According
to former Secretary of State Acheson;
The people themselves are one source of American
interest. . . . Americans as individuals are
interested in the people of /"South Vietnam_7.
We are not interested in them as pawns or as
subjects for exploitation but just as people.28
27
Ibid.
^^Helmet G. Callis, Foreign Capital in Southeast Asia (New York,
1942), p. 7.
CHAPTER V
UNITED STATES POLICIES IN VIET NAM UNDER
THE PAST THREE ADMINISTRATIONS
The Eisenhower Administration.--The Truman Administration in
1950 instituted America's aid program to Viet Nam through the French,
Its aim was to stop the expansion of Communism from China into
Southeast Asia. However, after the defeat of the French in 1954,
the Eisenhower Administration sent advisers to Viet Nam to take over
the training of the South Vietnamese Army. At that time, the United
States military advisers assigned to train the South Vietnamese Army
consisted of about 800 men. During the French-Vietnamese struggle,
the United States did not agree with French policy. This difference
of opinion created Franco-American antagonism. The French policy¬
makers felt that if the United States had only given them aid in the
form of troops, the war in Indo-China would have been won. United
States policy-makers, on the other hand, believed that what was
needed was an army made up of South Vietnamese. This was the
direction in which the United States policy was pursued.
The United States was somewhat reluctant in committing troops
in this war for several reasons. Roosevelt had set the precedent for
our attitudes toward colonial powers after the Second World War.
Eisenhower, in his campaign for the 1952 election,had promised the




Beginning on January 1, 1955, the United States gave aid directly
to the Saigon Government.^ The United States sent American Officers
under the leadership of General Collins to train the South Vietnamese
Army, Much of the actual training was continued under the French.
What was the Eisenhower Administration's plan? U. S. News and
World Report said:
The U. S. is going to shoulder the job of saving
what is now left of Indo-China from the Communists.
Two out of three South Vietnamese now under arms
will be demobilized during the coming year.
French forces are being encouraged to speed up,
rather than slow down, their departure from Indo-
China, More than half the French expeditionary
corps will be shipped home by next December.
Economic aid to South Indo-China will be stepped up
from 25 million to 100 million dollars in 1955.2
In its earliest phase, the Eisenhower administration thought of
our entanglement in Viet Nam as a temporary thing. We were to provide
a defense in South Viet Nam until the scheduled elections of 1956. The
United States'
. . .immediate objective is to prevent the Com¬
munists from taking over South Viet Nam by in¬
filtration before the 1956 elections. That's why
a mobile force for internal security is more urgent
now than a Vietnamese Army,^
The Administration, upon accepting the responsibility left by the
French, assisted the South Vietnamese through economic aid and military
^"U. S. Inherits Another Headache," U. S. News and World Report.




training. This administration, perhaps, believed that South Viet Nam
did not stand a chance in the 1956 elections; therefore, it may well
have encouraged the Diem regime not to permit them.
The Eisenhower policy centered around an aid program which was
to uphold the South Viet Nam regime. This aid was to sustain the
Vietnamese economy, and enhance the civilian administration. America's
overriding effort in this policy, it seems, was to defeat the Viet
Minh regime in North Viet Nam, The Eisenhower policy was to deal
directly in giving aid, wherever possible, instead of acting through
3 third party. Thus, our direct aid to Southeast Asia was instituted
under the Eisenhower Administration,
The Kennedy Administration.--The Kennedy Administration inherited
the Eisenhower policy. In 1961, however, Kennedy committed the United
States to a "more active role, declared Washington would do all it
could to save South Viet Nam from communism,"^ Kennedy increases aid*
At first, U, S. moved very slowly, increased ad¬
visory strength to 2,000, delivered propeller-
driven bombers to Vietnamese, ordered U. S.
servicemen to accompany Vietnamese Government
troops into the field.^
The Kennedy Administration was forced to increase assistance to
help defend the South Vietnamese, "Communist threat until 1960 was
mainly one of infiltration and subversion," but in "1961 Communist Viet
^"ABC's of the War in Vietnam," U, S, News and World Report,
June 28, 1965, p, 36,
^Ibid.
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Cong started making heavy inroads by turning to full-scale guerrilla
warfare,"^
In 1962, the Administration attempted to step up support:
Instead of quick victory, the United States now
is reconciling itself to a very long and stubborn
fight to help South Vietnam survive against
Communist infiltration.
Administration officials now are thinking in terms of
the 10-year struggle Malaya had to rid herself of
Communist guerrillas, and of the many bitter years
the Philippines had to fight to squelch Huk guerrillas.
And in Vietnam, apparently, the Kennedy Administration
now is not even thinking of total victory, but of
helping President Ngo Dinh Diem's government survive
and of helping him to make life so difficult for his
Viet Cong infiltrators that Communist North Vietnam,
the Soviet Union and Communist China will decide their
incitement is costing more than it gains,^
During that year, the United States expanded its operations in
Viet Nam, Our advisory force was increased to 11,000 men. The following
Q
year it expanded to 15,500 men, American forces took a more active
part in the air and ground operations.
During the latter months of Kennedy's Administration, animosity
developed between the Saigon regime and the Administration, United
States' assistance to South Viet Nam was restricted in order to make
President Diem stop his repressive action against the Buddhists.^
^Ibid.
^Cited in Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., The United States and Sino-Soviet
Bloc in Southeast Asia (Washington, 1962), p, 77.
®"ABC's of the War in Vietnam," op. cit., p, 37.
^"Praise of Ally Reserved," New York Times, October 27, 1963, p. 28.
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President Kennedy sent a message of greetings to President Diem
to mark the eighth anniversary of South Viet Nam's creation as a republic.
The traditional annual greeting contained no personal message to the
head of Saigon Government, reflecting the strain that developed between
the two Governments, Said President Kennedy:
On behalf of the American people I extend greetings
and best wishes to the Republic of Viet Nam on its
eighth anniversary. On this occasion I wish once
again to express the admiration of the American
people for the unfailing courage of the Vietnamese
people in their valiant struggle against the con¬
tinuing efforts of Communism to undermine and
destroy Vietnamese independence.
The United States of America has confidence in the
future of the Republic of Viet Nam, in its ability
both to overcome the present Communist threat to
its independence and to determine its own destiny.
We look forward to the day when peace is restored
and when the Vietnamese people can live in freedom
and prosperity.10
The Kennedy Administration pledged continued aid for the war
against Communist led guerrillas, but condemned Diem's suppression of
Buddhists.
The Johnson Administration.—Since Johnson has been President
of the United States, the conditions surrounding the war in Viet Nam
have gone from bad to worse. Beginning in 1964, while he was still
serving the remainder of Kennedy's Administration, Johnson commenced
a policy of bombing North Viet Nam, The Johnson Administration has
pursued the strongest policy yet in Viet Nam, The Administration
started the year of 1964 off by an augmentation of American advisers
10Ibid.
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to 23,000.^^ It sent modern jet fighter bombers to Viet Nam, This
policy called for an increase in the Special Forces,
The Administration offered to Congress a resolution spelling out
the United States commitment:
This resolution said that Congress 'approves and
supports the determination of the President, as
Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures
to repel any armed attack against the forces of the
U, S, and to prevent further aggression,' and,
'The United States regards as vital to its national
interest and to world peace the maintenance of
international peace and security in Southeast Asia,'
Further 'The United States is, therefore, prepared,
as the President determines, to take all necessary
steps, including use of armed force, to assist any
member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in
defense of its freedom,'!^
^^"ABC's of the War in Vietnam," op, cit,, p, 36,
^^Ibid,
CHAPTER VI
EVALUATION OF POLICIES OF THE PAST
THREE ADMINISTRATIONS
Domino Theory.—James Reston notes that
the American and South Vietnamese position was
crumbling fast, and the political and strategic
consequence of defeat would have been serious for
the free world all over Asie,
Serious for the free world of Asia, indeed -- when
every Asian country, except those ruled by puppet
regimes, demand that the United States get out and
stay out of South Vietnam.
To win support for its new ventures the United
States has resutrected the discredited Eisenhower
domino theory. If South Vietnam is lost, we cry, ^all of Southeast Asia will be lost to the Communists,
Is there any validity to the assumption that if South Vietnam
cannot be held, and is abandoned by the United States, the whole of
Southeast Asia will fall to the Communists? What is the "domino theory?"
This is the theory of the falling dominoes, that is, the loss of
South Viet Nam to the Communists would also upset the remaining states
of Laos and of Cambodia and engulf Southeast Asia and finally the whole
Asian continent. Thailand, still a United States ally, would be exposed
to Communist infiltration along its borders with Laos and Cambodia.
Thus, more than half surrounded, Thailand could not long resist. Burma's
^Cited in Hyman Lumer, "This is the Time to Speak Out," Political
Affairs. XLIV (March, 1965), 2.
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Government has already become friendly with Red China and would swiftly
fall completely under Communist domination if its neighbor Thailand
collapsed. That would take the Communists to the gates of India, a
vast country which already has been attacked by Chinese Communist forces
in Tibet.
It is assxmied by Western military men that if the United States
withdrew from South Viet Nam, Malaysia could not count for long on
help from Britain against Indonesia's attacks. With the Communists
apparently triumphant on the rest of the Asia mainland. South Korea
could not long endure. And the islands of Japan, Formosa and the
Philippines would not be expected to hold out.
According to Professor Kahin:
Since the end of the last war, American officials’, , .
most consistent failure has been an inability to
appreciate the importance of Asian nationalism, and
to work with rather than against this powerful force.^
Kahin believes that there is a flaw in the domino theory, thus he
continues:
Non-Communist governments of Southeast Asia will not
automatically collapse if the Communists should come
to control all of Vietnam. So long as Southeast
Asian governments are in harmony with their nation's
nationalism, so long as they are wise enough to meet
the most pressing economic and social demands of their
people, they are not likely to succumb to communism.3
2cited in Andrew Kopkind, "The Teach-In-," The New Republic,
May 29, 1965, p. 15.
^Ibid.
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The overriding factor in American policy then would be to support
the aspirations of the nationalist movements in the various countries.
Professor Morgenthau looks at the Communist communities in Europe
and gives his opinion about the "domino theory:"
We have even dignified this historic determinism
with the name of a theory, the so-called 'Domino
Theory,' It assumes that as South Vietnam goes
so will Thailand, and as Thailand goes so will
India, and so forth, until the whole world will
have gone Communist, This theory is a slogan bom
of fear and of a misconception of history and
politics. It is unsupported by any historic evi¬
dence.
The Soviet Union went Communist in 1917 and China
in 1949, but no other nation followed suit. In
1945, Poland and Hungary went Communist, but Finland
did not, and all the Balkan States went Communist, but
Greece did not. In 1948 Czechoslovakia went Communist,
but no other nation did. In 1954 North Vietnam went
Communist all by herself, and in 1960 or so Cuba went
Communist without being followed by any other Latin
American nation. . ,
Professor Morgenthau maintains that the "Domino Theory" is a grand
illusion. It is "a replica of a vulgar Marxism which also believes in
the inevitable spread of Communism from one country to the rest of the
world,
Criticisms.--America's policies toward Viet Nam have been criticized
from the moment she assumed the burden which the French left there. As
a matter of fact, France was one of the first critics:
, , .many observers here suspect that the U, S. is
cutting back aid and military forces in Indo-China
^"Russia, the U. S. and Vietnam," The New Republic. May 1, 1965, p. 13.
^Ibid.
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because it already has decided to write off South
Vietnam,6
It does not seem very likely that there was any validity to that
statement. Ultra-Right elements in our society, however, assert that
the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations were soft on Communism,
The Right Wing demanded that we make clear our readiness to fight "to
win" and end all this "tit-for-tattery" by taking the war to the real
source of the threat, that is. Communist China and Russia.
Because of the escalation of the war efforts, Johnson's administra¬
tion has been under more criticism recently than the two administrations
preceding it. Questions are being asked the Administration:
Where then is the Johnson Administration heading?
Is it ready to risk all out war to hold on to his
springboard to crush the national liberation move¬
ment under the guise of preventing a Communist
'take-over?' Is it flexing its military muscles
in order to negotiate 'from strength' and impose
a settlement on its own terms?^
It seems that most of our policies in this area have been established
on the idea that national liberation movements and Communist take-overs
are synon3rmous. Senator Frank Church, writing in the Saturday Evening
Post, stated;
We only deceive ourselves when we pretend that the
struggle in Vietnam is not a civil war. The two
parts of Vietnam don't represent two different
peoples, with separate identities. Vietnam is a
partitioned country in the grip of a continuing
^"U, S, Inherited Another Headache," U. S. News and World Report.
December 10, 1954, p. 26.
^Hyman Lumer, "This is the Time to Speak Out," Political Affairs.
XLIV (March, 1965), 2.
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revolution, , ,
The United States has refused to discuss the issues with the Viet
Cong. She has, instead, been looking for solution to the situation in
Viet Nam by way of Hanoi, Moscow or China, The United States could
try to get through to the Viet Cong. They might not respond immediately.
But the door should be pushed open and kept open. It seems that if
the Administration were to recognize the Viet Cong, that would mean a
victory for them; therefore, a major mistake of the Administration to
the present has been to point to a door marked "unconditional discussion,"
which has also been marked, "no admittance for the Viet Cong," thus in¬
hibiting a response from any quarter.
Professor John Kenneth Galbraith says; "We are badly out of date
and still behave as though the neutral nations were major considerations
in the cold war," He believes that our foreign policy is overly "cautious
and boring,"^
Senator Fulbright is one who does not completely agree with
Administration's policy in Viet Nam, Says Time;
Fulbright favors neutralization in the long run and
hopes for an improvement in the political and
military situation in Vietnam chiefly as a way to get
the U, S, to the conference table in a better bar¬
gaining position. Should present U. S, policy become
untenable, leading to a choice between staying in
through escalation or getting out through negotiation,
Fulbright would get out -- but he does not believe
that the choice is imminent. He strongly opposes
escalation and argues; 'you can't selectively do a
®"We Should Negotiate a Settlement in Vietnam," Saturday Evening
Post. April 24, 1965, p. 14.
"The Ultimate Self-Interest," Time, January 22, 1965, p. 16.
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little bombing,' . , .says Fulbright, there is no
telling where it might lead, because 'you can't see
down the road far enough'.
Bernard Fall maintains that our involvement in Viet Nam has led
us to a condition of "unattainable victory and unacceptable surrender.
Morgenthau, an anti-Administration advocate, has condemned the Johnson
Administration of Realpolitik "for being in Viet Nam ' in order to con¬
tain Communism, not for the freedom of South Viet Nam or the commit¬
ments which we have entered into'."12 Professor Mary Wright argues:
"It's almost the last moment to retreat in Viet Nam and salvage something.’
Morgenthau insists that the "U. S. should seek the unification
of Viet Nam 'probably under Ho Chi Minh,' with the United Nations help
and some kind of 'face-saving device' to ease American withdrawal.
These critics tried to prove that there have been bad policies pursued
by administrations in the past two decades, but the Johnson Administration
is the worst.
Alteimatives.—What general policy should govern United States
relations with the government of South Viet Nam? There are several
alternatives for the United States policy in Viet Nam.









Just as the signatories of the Geneva settlement were able in 1961
to negotiate a settlement concerning Laos, "the same approach should
be possible with respect to the hostilities in South Viet Nam."^^ This
type of negotiations would probably investigate the violation of the
Geneva agreement. It seems obvious that North Viet Nam has violated
the accords, in that it has given the Viet Cong support for the revo¬
lutionary activities in South Viet Nam, Nevertheless, the United States
and South Viet Nam were not signatories of the Geneva Accords, but,
according to one writer, they too have
Violated the accords, beginning with the refusal to
discuss all-Vietnam elections, as provided in the
Geneva Agreement, and ending with the introduction
of American arms and personnel beyond the limits
stipulated by the accords. Should the United States
and South Vietnam governments be willing to accept a
settlement consistent with the Geneva Accords, nego¬
tiations might offer prospects for an agreement
ending the hostilities,,,, A negotiated settlement
offering some satisfaction, , ,and an end to hostili¬
ties could benefit both sides,
According to some, the United States should seek a United Nations
solution to the Viet Nam problem. Senator Wayne Morse believes:
We should be seeking some kind of settlement that
will carry out the 1954 objective of removing
foreign domination from the old Indo-China, but this
time with an effective guarantee of international
enforcement.
The only way the fighting there can ever be ended is
through a political settlement among the interested
l^oiiver E, Clubb, Jr,, The United States and The Sino-Soviet
Bloc in Southeast Asia (Washington, 1962), p, 128,
^^Ibid.. p, 129.
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parties, guaranteed by an international agency.
It might be possible to generate more international support for
a satisfactory Viet Nam solution in the United Nations, with its large
body of parties, than in a conference limited to a small number of
interested governments. The present pace and course of the war are
pretty unsatisfactory, but equally unsatisfactory would be complete
withdrawal, therefore, some middle ground must be sought, perhaps
through the United Nations involvement.
Others believe that the United States should bring about a
negotiated settlement. This type of settlement would mean something
similar to the Geneva Agreement. It could very easily save many
American lives.
Under this condition the United States could make whatever con¬
cessions are necessary and get out quickly rather than risk a long war.
U. S. News and World Report, said:
The conclusion of those who now shape U. S. policy is
that this country -- acting for the non-Communist
world — cannot afford to accept a victory by the
Communist powers in Vietnam. This means that if
war escalates into major size, such a major war will
be accepted by the U. S. as an alternative to defeat
Communism rather than a withdrawal from Vietnam and,
progressively, from all of Asia.^^
The United States could drive for total victory. This seems to
be what the United States is presently doing. This action will probably
require a heavy involvement of United States' soldiers.
^^"Key Senators Tell What to Do About Vietnam," U. S. News and
World Report. February 15, 1965, p. 69.
ISiiwhy u. S. Risks Big War In Asia," U. S. News and World
Report, March 15, 1965, p. 32.
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Prospects.--The direction in which the present policy of the United
States is headed could very well lead into another conflict similar to
that which took place in Korea. U, S. News and World Report says the
war in Vietnam is taking on, for the Americans, a
growing resemblance to the 1950-53 war in Korea, ...
The Korean War, after Red China became involved, re¬
quired more than 350,000 American military men on
the scene.
At this time, U, S, involvement in Vietnam is growing
because that war has been going from bad to worse
under rules that restricted the United States to a
purely secondary role,^^
The conflict has produced a stalemate, and could possibly lead
to World War III, The present policy of the United States in Viet
Nam may force China and Russia onto the battlefield. Professor
Morgenthau writes;
It is likewise easy to see why the Soviet Union would
take an active part in the hostilities only with the
greatest reluctance, being forced by American policy
to take a course of action it would not have taken
if it had had a choice. ... However anxious the
Soviet Union is to avoid a direct military confronta¬
tion with the United States, it is not willing to buy
that avoidance with its abdication as leader and
protector of its Communist allies.20
Morgenthau believes that if the United States continues to step
up its operations in Viet Nam, which to this time have been "a
complete failure as an inducement to bring Hanoi to the negotiating
table, they are rather likely to succeed in bringing the Soviet Union
19
"Vietnam -- To be Another Korea?," U, S, News and World
Report, June 21, 1965, p. 27.
20
"Russia, the U, S. and Vietnam," op, cit., p, 69
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to the battlefields of Southeast Asia.''^! Morgenthau asserts:
. . ,it is the task of statesmanship to settle
disputes in such a way to minimize the damage to
the prestige of the parties concerned. Of such
statesmanship there is not a trace to be found on
either side. As a result, we are moving closer and
closer to that military confrontation which nobody







Throughout most of the ages, Viet Nam has been a victim of
foreign domination. India was the first such foreign country to have
a profound effect upon the cultural aspect of Vietnamese life. Later,
China conquered Viet Nam in 111 B. C., and dominated its political,
social and economic life for one thousand years.
During the tenth century, the Vietnamese were able to cast off
the shackle of Chinese control, and from the tenth century through
the fifteenth, the Vietnamese payed homage to China. Then Viet Nam
was conquered by China once more, but after twenty years of occupation
the foreign conqueror was driven out again by the Vietnamese.
From the time of this liberation, in 1427, the Kingdom of Viet
Nam, later called empire, managed to maintain a status of independence
from China. It was only in 1863 that French colonizers moved into
this area and took over control of that section of the country south
of Saigon. The rest of the country, including what is now North Viet
Nam, became a protectorate of France in 1883. An emperor ruled the
protectorate until the end of World War II.
From 1940 to 1945, the Japanese occupied Viet Nam. During that
period the French collaborated with the Japanese, and their civil
administration was permitted to continue under Japanese control, and
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there developed a strong opposition, largely inspired by the concept
of nationalism. It was directed against both the French and the
Japanese. When the Japanese surrendered in August, 1945, these op¬
position elements organized a revolutionary movement, headed by Ho
Chi Minh, which declared a Republic of Viet Nam.
America's victory in the Pacific helped achieve the liberation
of Viet Nam from the Japanese. In August and September of 1945, France
prepared to reconquer this country. Although the Roosevelt Administra¬
tion stated its disapproval of the French attempt to restore its full
colonial rule over Viet Nam, the Truman Administration "offered no
protest" against France's reoccupational attempt.^
France provoked hostilities in Viet Nam by her effort to reinstate
its sovereignty over that country. "The French effort to overcome the
Republic of Viet Nam drove its leaders, who had demonstrated a desire
O
to retain close ties with France, into the arms of Communist China."
The United States, in 1946, was not altogether pleased with actions
pursued by the French in Viet Nam; therefore, the United States maintained
a policy of non-intervention until 1949, at which time, the Chinese
Communist victory in China stirred American perceptions concerning the
intentions of the Chinese Communist in Southeast Asia. The United
States sent a special mission to Southeast Asia to seize up the situation.
"While representatives from other parts of Asia reportly counseled
against a deep American commitment to what might prove a losing course,
^Oliver E. Clubb, Jr., The United States and the Sino-Soviet Bloc
in Southeast Asia (Washington, 1962), p. 51.
^Ibid.
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those from Southeast Asia strongly urged a heavy American effort in
Viet Nam to prevent the expansion of coimnunism south from China, The
conference decided in favor of "giving aid to France to help improve
those conditions,"^
The United States, in May, 1950, agreed to give military and
economic aid to France, Our country stressed these major points in
regard to the aid:
(1) Primary responsibility for the defense of Indo¬
china would fall on France and the governments and
peoples of Indo-China,
(2) United States aid was being granted for 'the
restoration of security' and 'the development of
genuine nationalism,'
(3) United States aid would go not to France alone
but to the Associated States of Indo-China and to
France in order to assist them in restoring stability
and permitting these states to pursue their peace¬
ful and democratic development,^
From 1950 until the French were defeated in 1954, the United
States under the Eisenhower Administration continued the Truman policy
in Southeast Asia, Our assistance was steadily stepped up under
Eisenhower,
The Eisenhower Administration wanted to conduct a policy described
as 'united action' in Southeast Asia, but at the Berlin Conference,
the British opposed such action and suggested that the Viet Nam issue
be taken to the forthcoming Geneva Conference. In 1954, the Viet




them at Biendienphu. Being faced with strong opposition from Britain,
the United States conceded and wished something would come out of the
Geneva Conference that would improve the Viet Nam situation,^
The Geneva Conference ended the war. Laos, Viet Nam, and
Cambodia gained independence and were militarily neutralized. The
end result of this agreement did not meet the United States' desired
ends. The United States, therefore, refused to sign the accords.
The United States of America, although present at the Geneva
Conference of 1954, refused to sign the final agreement to bring an
end to the war in Viet Nam. Russell H. Fifield asserts:
President Eisenhower on July 21 and Secretary Dulles
on July 23 indicated that the Geneva settlement
contained provisions that the United States did not
like, and that it did not consider itself a party
to or bound by them.^
In 1956, the United States together with South Viet Nam refused
to allow the people of South Viet Nam to select their own government
by ballot, as required by the Geneva Accord.^
Vite Nam and American relations date back to 1950, when the
Truman Administration thought it was wise to assist France in her ef¬
fort to prevent a Communist take-over. After the Geneva Agreement,
American policy, under the Eisenhower Administration, was centered
around an aid program.
^Ibid.. p. 58.
^Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958
(New York, 1958), p. 302.
^Hugh Deane, The War In Vietnam (New York, 1963), p. 8.
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Eisenhower began channeling economic and military aid directly
to the Diem Government and assumed the responsibility for training the
Vietnamese army.
That policy was continued under the Kennedy Administration, Later,
Kennedy expanded that policy by increasing the number of American advisers
in Viet Nam.
The Johnson Administration kept up the Kennedy policy and later
was forced to expand it by bombing North Viet Nam. The policy also
entailed the commitment of American troops in face to face combat with
the Viet Cong.
Both Eisenhow and Kennedy Administrations were criticized mostly
for being soft on Communism; whereas, the Johnson Administration has
come under criticism for taking a firm stand against Communist ag¬
gression in Viet Nam. Johnson has steadily increased the number of
soldiers in South Viet Nam in an effort to defeat the Communist of
North Viet Nam, Not only is the number of soldiers increasing but other
aids of warfare are being supplied there.
The commitment of American troops and the bombing of industrial
centers in North Viet Nam have caused many critics to believe that
there were other alternatives beside the.one the Administration was
pursuing. Some critics think that the present policy could possibly
lead to a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.
According to many the Administration should seek a negotiated
settlement, others want the Viet Nam problem taken to the United Nations,
and still others are of the opinion that the co-sponsors of the Geneva
Accords should settle the Viet Nam problem, or the United States should
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